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This article will compare the treatment of the order of charity to neighbor in Saint Augustine of Hippo and Saint Thomas Aquinas. In particular, it will relate the similarities and the 
differences in their treatment of the subject, and will attempt to 
explain their differences in terms of their family environment and life 
experience, geographical and historical context, intellectual education 
and philosophical affiliation, and personality.
The Order of Charity to Neighbor
Saint Augustine deals with the order of charity to neighbor in a 
great variety of his works. The most important references can be found 
in De Doctrina Christiana, his sermons, the City of God, his commentaries 
on the Psalms and De Trinitate. Saint Augustine puts forth three main 
criteria according to which the order of charity needs to be exercised: 
a) family, b) need and c) chance. The first criterion is common with 
Saint Thomas while the second and the third are largely not. He does 
not provide a detailed and systematic treatment of each criterion.
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Saint Thomas addresses the order of charity to neighbor especially 
in the Summa Theologiae IIa, IIae, q. 26, in De Caritate1 and in his 
commentary on the Sentences. His criteria are: a) family, b) virtue, 
c) closeness to first principle and d) utility to the common good. Unlike 
Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas provides a detailed and systematic 
ordering of charity. This includes a ranking of preference for charity 
within the family, with, for instance, the love of parents taking 
precedence over the love of one’s children2 and the love of one’s father 
taking precedence over the love of one’s mother, other things like their 
holiness and goodness being equal. According to Saint Thomas, we 
are also to love more those who are “better” and closer to God—as 
he argues that God Himself does—as well as those who are more 
useful to the common good, particularly as regards matters of action 
(as opposed to in meeting needs).
Family
The different treatment of family in Saint Augustine and Saint 
Thomas can be explained by their drawing on different parts of the 
Bible. The more generic, non-rule-bound treatment of Saint Augustine 
is consistent with the gist and flavor of the Bible as a whole and the 
Gospels in particular, where there is no strict ordering of charity 
across family members. The ordering of charity across family members 
espoused by Saint Thomas, on the other hand, seems to follow more 
1Because De Caritate is thought to have been written late in Saint Thomas’ life 
(circa 1269–1272), toward the end of his writing the Summa, it will be assumed 
that the principles included in both works are complementary.
2As regards the provision of necessities, however, Saint Thomas does indicate 
that one is bound more to the child than to the parent based on 2 Cor. 12:14: 
“Children ought not to save for their parents but parents for their children.” Cf. 
also Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, II.II, q. 26, a. 9 (hereafter cited as ST). 
The edition used in this article is the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
2nd rev. ed., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920), made 
available at http://newadvent.org/summa/ by Kevin Knight (2008) (accessed 
August 3, 2015).
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closely the wisdom literature and, in particular, the Book of Sirach, 
especially as it refers to the preference of parents over children and 
fathers over mothers.3
In their actual lives, it seems that Saint Augustine and Saint 
Thomas may have exercised charity to family in a somewhat different 
manner. Both saints were very close to their families and exercised 
charity—monetary and otherwise—on their behalf throughout their 
lives. However, it seems that Saint Thomas was more exclusively linked 
to his family in his exercise of charity4 while Saint Augustine—largely 
due to his public position as a bishop—exercised charity with a great 
variety of people and favored the poor.5 On the other hand, and 
probably due to his lifestyle as a scholastic friar, the only mention 
of financial aid provision by Saint Thomas in Torrell is as follows: 
“Thomas knew how to find ecclesiastical funds, with the permission 
of Clement IV, in order to come to his family’s aid.”6
3The section of chapter 3 devoted to “duties to parents” seems to favor fathers 
over mothers, e.g., “My son, take care of your father when he is old; grieve him 
not as long as he lives” (Sir. 3:12). Similarly, the exclusion of a section on duties 
towards children can possibly be interpreted as favoring parents over children.
4De Caritate IX. Taken from Thomas Aquinas, On Charity [De Caritate], trans. 
Lottie H. Kendzierski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1960), as found 
at http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVirtutibus2.htm (accessed August 3, 
2015). Hereafter cited as DC.
5“Augustine would attempt to canalize this tradition of lavish giving, in 
favour of alms to the Christian poor; and he would himself show humanitas, an 
open-handed courtesy, by giving a banquet to the poor on the anniversary of his 
ordination, and in entertaining his many visitors … compared with traditional 
occasions for showing generosity, alms-giving seemed too indiscriminate [to 
the well-heeled in his society]” (Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 
new ed. [Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 2000], 193).
6Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 1: The Person and His Work, rev. 
ed. & trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2005), 12.
54 Alonso i Terme
Need aNd ChaNCe iN SaiNt auguStiNe
The principle of need is fundamental in Saint Augustine. As he 
states in De Doctrina Christiana:
If you came across two people of whom neither was more obviously in 
need, or more closely related to you than the other, there is nothing 
more just that you could do than to toss for it, to decide which of them 
should be given what could not be given to both.7
Namely, in addition to family, the other main criterion to use in 
allocating charity is need as we are presumed to be bound to offer 
help to the person who is “more obviously in need.” Charity based on 
need is a fundamental biblical principle, present from the hospitality 
of Abraham to the admonitions of the prophets, the mass feedings 
of Jesus and the lives of the primitive Christian communities who 
had “no one needy amongst them.”8 Saint Augustine’s is a natural 
application of this principle. It will also provide a neat link to his view 
of the multiplication of relationships of love as the basis of the good 
society and the city of God.
The criterion of need in the distribution of charity is to be used 
not just for monetary or physical assistance but also for moral support. 
In DDC, Saint Augustine states:
… we are given to understand that anyone is our neighbor to whom the 
duty of compassion is to be extended when needed. From which it now 
follows that anyone by whom such kindness in turn should be shown 
to us is also our neighbor. But anybody can see that no exception is 
made of any to whom the duty of compassion can be denied, when 
7Augustine of Hippo, De Doctrina Christiana, in Teaching Christianity, trans. 
Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1996), 1.28.29 (italics added). 
Hereafter referred to as DDC, with citations referring to book, chapter and 
paragraph numbers of De Doctrina Christiana itself.
8The possible references to the need principle in the Bible are almost endless, 
including also the obligation to leave the sides of the fields un-harvested for 
the poor, the forgiveness of debt at the jubilee, the prohibition of taking basic 
collateral from the poor and the obligation to pay a worker’s wages before sunset.
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the command is extended even to enemies, with the Lord also telling 
us: “Love your enemies; do good to those who hate you (Mt. 5:44).”9
Not only are we summoned to extend help “when needed,” but 
we are also encouraged to focus our moral assistance and loving 
friendship on those human beings who need it most. Indeed, “charity, 
like a nurse caring for her children, gives the weak preference over 
the strong, not that they are more worthy of love, but more needy of 
help.”10 Love, in God, ought to be distributed equally and charitable 
assistance—whether financial or moral—according to need.
Finally, Saint Augustine includes chance as his third principle for 
the ordering of charity to neighbor:
… as you are unable to take care of all your fellow men, treat it as the 
luck of the draw when time and circumstance brings some into closer 
contact with you than others.11
The principle of chance is also a natural distillation of the actual 
practice of charity to neighbor at the individual level which we find 
practiced in the Bible. Whereas there are a number of rules for the 
practice of charity at the societal level (such as tithing or the equitable 
distribution of the land of Israel among the tribes), giving at the 
individual level follows the “luck of the draw” of Saint Augustine. The 
Jewish patriarchs as well as Jesus and his apostles do charity to the 
needy they happen to encounter. It is the only way to not “close your 
hand to the poor” (Deut. 15:7)12 and to apply the injunction “delay not 
9DDC 1.30.31 (italics added).
10Augustine of Hippo, “Letter of Saint Augustine to Marcellinus,” in Fathers 
of the Church: Saint Augustine Letters Vol. 3, trans. Wilfrid Parsons (Catholic 
University of America Press, 1953), 57.
11DDC 1.28.29 (italics added).
12The injunction in the Book of Deuteronomy refers to “one of your kinsmen 
in any community” who is “in need” (cf. Deut. 15:7). Saint Augustine interprets 
your brother or kinsman to be any human being and stresses that we are to 
love all human beings equally as they are all made in God’s image, and that 
we love Christ in them regardless of kinship or virtue. In DDC, interpreting 
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to give to the needy; a beggar in distress do not reject” (Sir. 4:3–4). 
It is also a practical principle as an individual would be hard-pressed 
to run either a fully “needs-based” or fully “virtue-based” system of 
charitable allocations.
Virtue, FirSt PriNCiPle aNd utility to the 
CommoN good iN SaiNt thomaS
After family, the other central principle for ordering charity in 
the system of Saint Thomas is virtue understood as the virtue of the 
one receiving charity. Saint Thomas bases this principle on the fact 
that a) charity is an actualization of love, b) love needs to be ordered 
as God Himself does and c) God loves those who are more virtuous 
more than those who are less so. It is also related to Saint Thomas’ 
understanding of friendship, which is deeply influenced by Aristotle 
and, arguably, the wisdom literature.
In the Nichomachean Ethics, the basis of friendship is love-worthiness, 
the highest form of which is virtue, with lower forms being based on 
“pleasure or utility.” The “perfect friendship” only occurs between the 
virtuous: “good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e., in virtue 
of their goodness.”13 These friends (the virtuous) ideally live together 
and have everything in common—the ultimate form of charity. These 
principles are mirrored in Saint Thomas’ view that “it is necessary that 
what is more similar to the one loving be loved more.”14
Saint Thomas’ principle of virtue also mirrors closely the Book of 
Sirach where the preferences in love and friendship for the virtuous are 
many. Perhaps most prominently, the book states God’s lesser love for 
sinners—“The Most High Himself hates sinners and upon the wicked 
Rom. 13:9, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” he states: “every single 
human being is to be counted as a neighbor, because wrong is not to be done 
to anybody” (DDC 1.32).
13Jonathan Barnes, ed., Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. 2: The Revised Oxford 
Translation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1829.
14De Caritate IX, ad. 5.
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He takes vengeance” (Sir. 12: 7)—and seems to espouse the need to 
emulate God’s preference as it encourages virtuous humans to “have 
just men for your table companions” (Sir. 9:10). Overall, the book 
contains an idea of friendship favoring the virtuous and shunning the 
sinful (especially Chapters 11–13) which is very akin to that portrayed 
in the Nichomachean Ethics.
Similarly, both in the Summa15 and in De Caritate, Saint Thomas 
argues that, since the ultimate good to be loved in charity is God, 
people who are “more one with God ought to be loved more out of 
charity.”16 As expressed in the Summa, “[o]ur neighbors are not all 
equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their 
greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more 
than those who are not so near to Him.”17 It would also seem that, 
for Saint Thomas, the criterion of virtue trumps that of need as the 
virtuous should not be denied their desert on account of the needy: 
“we are not giving to a person that love which we ought to give if we 
love more one whom we ought to love less. For, it can happen that in 
the moment of necessity we give more to the latter, to the neglect of the 
former whom we ought to love more.”18
The Aristotelian idea of first principle is also used by Saint Thomas 
as a guide to dispensing charity. Perhaps the most obvious example 
of the use of this criterion is in his ranking the due charity to father 
above that of mother because of his physical understanding of fathers 
as “active” first principles in procreation as opposed to the “passivity” 
of mothers.19 He also argues that those who are more useful to the 
common good are to be favored in our love, including even above 
15ST II.II, q. 26.
16DC IX, ad. 5.
17ST II.II, q. 26, a. 6, ad. 2.
18DC IX, ad. 11 (italics added).
19ST II.II, q. 26, a. 10, co.
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our family members, albeit not in the “provision of necessaries” but 
in “matters of action”20: 
… he ought to show more of the effects of love towards his parents 
than toward someone who is not a member of his family; except if by 
chance, when the common good which each one ought also to desire 
for himself would depend on the good of someone who is not a member 
of one’s family, as when one would expose himself to the danger of 
death in order to save the general of the army in war time, or to save 
the leader of a state insofar as the welfare of the entire community 
depends on these men.21
The Multiplication of Loving Friendships as the 
Foundation of a Global Society in Saint Augustine
In Saint Augustine, love, as God’s most essential feature, should 
be the guiding principle of humanity. His section in DDC devoted 
to “love of God and neighbor is the sum of what scripture teaches” 
opens with the quote “the fulfillment and the end of the law and of all 
the divine scripture is love” (Rom. 13:8 and 1 Tim 1:5).22 According to 
Saint Augustine, we are to love all human beings equally in the sense 
of “benevolence,” namely that we are to desire that they grow closer 
to God, including our enemies.
Because friendship is rooted in Christian love, it cannot, unlike in 
the classical world, be limited to a small circle of like individuals. Saint 
Augustine does recognize that “it must include all those to whom love 
and affection are due, although it goes out more readily to some, more 
slowly to others, but it reaches even our enemies for whom we are 
commanded to pray.”23 In Hanna Arendt’s words, this is a self-denying 
20ST II.II, q. 26, a. 8, ad 1.
21DC IX, ad. 15.
22DDC 1.35.39.
23The Fathers of the Church: Saint Augustine Letters, Vol. 2 (83-130), trans. Wilfrid 
Parsons (The Catholic University of America, 1953), 386.
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(rather than utilitarian) friendship in which the basic equality of the 
friend is in his or her being conceived simply as God’s creature:
In this way the neighbor loses the meaning of his concrete worldly 
existence, for example, as a friend or enemy. For the lover who loves as 
God loves, the neighbor ceases to be anything but a creature of God. 
The lover meets a man defined by God’s love simply as God’s creation. 
All meet in this love, denying themselves and their mutual ties.24
Saint Augustine sees the multiplication of loving relationships as 
the foundation and the engine for the construction of the city of God. 
For him, these relationships should flourish among all human beings 
of any condition or character. This is because of a number of reasons. 
First, because we are unable to properly assess a person’s virtue, we 
should not avoid people of apparently lesser virtue and remember that 
they are likely to have some hidden qualities that we personally lack.25 
Second, because human beings have great hidden potential, by refusing 
our love and friendship to those who appear (or may be) less virtuous, 
we are not only harming them but are also depriving ourselves of a 
great potential good. Thus, by refusing our love and friendship to those 
24Arendt also states that “In this meeting all people have an equal, though 
very minor, relevance to their own being. … Love of neighbor leaves the lover 
himself in absolute isolation and the world remains a desert for man’s isolated 
existence” (Hannah Arendt, Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, & Judith Chelius Stark, 
Love and Saint Augustine [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996], 94). I would 
disagree with this assessment. On the contrary, and with Saint Augustine, I see 
this egalitarian universal friendship in Christ as the ultimate uniting force of 
humankind. It is not impersonal but, on the contrary, profoundly personal, albeit 
with differing degrees of intensity depending on the degree of actual closeness 
that each friendship is able to attain. It reverses a pre-existing alienation rather 
than creating it.
25It is particularly important not to equate the city of God with those inside 
the Church and the earthly city with those outside it as the two cities are 
mixed together and will be so until the end of times: “many who seem outside 
are really inside and many who seem inside are really outside” (Commentary/
Exposition on Psalm 106.14; a translation is available at http://www.newadvent.
org/fathers/1801.htm).
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who appear (or may be) less virtuous, we are not only harming them 
but are also depriving ourselves of a great potential good.
Third, Saint Augustine’s thought is based on a profound 
egalitarianism. As regards friendship and charity, this egalitarianism 
is based on a Biblical view of humanity as a single family with a 
common descent from Adam. It is also founded on the belief that, in 
most cases, friendship has the potential of bringing out qualities that 
are not evident, eventually revealing a basic equality among human 
beings. And fourth, because Saint Augustine’s view of friendship 
is, as Arendt phrases it, a “self-denying love [that] means loving by 
renouncing oneself; and this in turn means to love all people so 
completely without distinctions ….”26 With such a perspective, love 
can be had with everyone, not just with the “like-minded.”
The multiplication of relationships, however, increases suffering 
due to longing as well as the risk of loss and betrayal. Saint Augustine 
recognizes that the more numerous the relationships and the more 
widely scattered they are across the world, the greater are our fears that 
any ill may befall our friends. The greater the number of friends—and 
the more diverse these friends are—the greater the danger that “they 
may fail us in faithfulness, turn to hate us and work us harm.”27 
However, this is a risk that we must take while we also remember that 
the greater the number of our friends, the greater our joy will be.28
26Arendt, et al., Love and Saint Augustine, 95.
27Augustine of Hippo, The City of God, trans. Gerald G. Walsh, et al., intro. 
Étienne Gilson (New York: Doubleday, Image Books, 1958), 447 [City of God 
Book 19, Chapter 8]. Hereafter referred to as CG.
28Even for Saint Augustine, however, the only real, full-fledged friendship is 
the one cemented on a common love of God: “But he was not then my friend, 
nor, indeed, afterwards, as true friendship is; for true it is not but in such as 
You bind together, cleaving unto You by that love which is shed abroad in 
our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us” (Augustine of Hippo, 
Confessions IV.4.7, in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, 
Vol. 1., trans. J. G. Pilkington [Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing 
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The ideal for Saint Augustine is to have a society in which all 
human beings are bound in friendly relationships of love. This web 
of relationships would restore the loss of unity of fallen humanity; in 
Saint Augustine’s words, “he who loves his brother endures all things 
for the sake of unity.”29 Devoting oneself to building such webs will 
entail foregoing the joy of more intimate friendships for the sake of 
building as wide as possible a net of service-oriented friendships, 
including with weaker and needier brothers and sisters. As argued in 
CG, these relationships can and should be developed inside as well as 
outside formal institutions.30
The multiplication of loving relationships would thus form the 
basis of individual holiness as well as social harmony. Saint Augustine 
believed that the path to holiness was through unity with God, which 
could only be achieved through unity with one’s fellow human beings. 
The Fall created division and alienation from ourselves, from each 
other and from God. The multiplication of relationships of love is the 
path to the restoration of that lost loving unity. That perfect unity and 
love can no longer be attained in this world, but approximating it to 
the extent possible depends solely on love through grace.
The multiplication of loving relationships would bind the individual 
(micro) to the societal (meso) and upwards to universal (macro) human 
interaction, ultimately reaching out to the divine (supernal). In Saint 
Augustine, societal interaction will approximate the city of God to 
the extent that individuals are able to build loving relationships. This, 
however, is not innate or necessary. We are fallen humanity torn in 
diverging directions and we will only be able to build the city of God 
Co., 1887], rev. & ed. Kevin Knight (2009) for New Advent, made available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110104.htm).
29Saint Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 112-124 (Tractates on the First 
Epistle of John), trans. John W. Rettig (The Catholic University of America 
Press: 1995), 138.
30Cf. CG Book XIX, especially Chapters 7, 8 and 13.
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partially. The earthly city will always exist and encompass those unable 
to build loving relationships. It all then begins with the individual:
We must be friends with ourselves and with our families before we can 
have any hope of being friends with fellow human beings. When there 
is peace at the center (in the individual human), there are ripples of 
love that flow out in ever widening circles embracing more and more 
in the bond of friendship.31
And it is this construction of ever-widening circles of love that helps 
us reach unity with God Himself: “[t]he peace-makers of this world 
will finally enjoy the perfect peace of union with God. Then there will 
no longer be alienation. There will be only love.”32 Saint Augustine’s 
theology is thus rooted simultaneously in psychology, sociology and, to 
a lesser extent, politics, linking together all levels of human interaction. 
It is not “institutions” or “rules” that truly bind humanity; rather, it 
is an ever-widening multiplication of individual relationships of love 
grounded in and striving to reach God. Unlike formal institutions 
which, like the Roman Empire, come and go, these relationships are 
the eternal good reaching out to unity with the eternal God.
This concept of friendship seems modeled on the actual 
relationships reflected in the Bible and especially in the primitive 
Christian communities both within themselves as well as in the 
linkages that they established with each other and the world around 
them. They were diverse, dynamic and apostolic ever-widening 
networks of loving friendship expanding across the world.33
31Donald X. Burt, Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine’s Practical 
Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 8. Cf. 
CG XIX.16.
32Burt, Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine’s Practical Philosophy, 8.
33Saint Augustine also builds on the concept of friendship found in the classical 
world, in particular Cicero’s De Amicitia, but he thoroughly transforms it by 
imbuing it with Christian equality and universality.
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Friendship and Love in Saint Thomas: 
Knowledge, Affinity and Society
The concept of friendship in Saint Thomas is highly reminiscent 
of the classical ideal of friendship, in particular that of Aristotle’s. It 
is friendship among the like-minded and focused on a small circle of 
friends. It is also a friendship that is firmly based on knowledge.34 This 
close relationship of knowledge and love is also at the core of the Bible 
at the most intimate level possible—that between lover and beloved. 
The Hebrew word “da’at” means both to know as well as to love (e.g., 
Vayeda adam od et ishto: “And Adam knew his wife again” [Gen. 4:25]). 
It is such an intimate connection that it even entails that “the lover is 
transformed into the inner identity of the beloved.”35 In Father Kauth’s 
paraphrase of Saint Thomas: “love is first ontological congruity in the 
good, consequent on the apprehensive power’s discovery.”36
Such an intimate connection as exists within couples or among 
close friends cannot possibly be had with many. It is based on close 
34In Saint Augustine, knowledge also plays a role as we cannot love what we 
do not know (Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate X.1, in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3, trans. Arthur West Haddan (Buffalo, 
NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), rev. & ed. Kevin Knight (2009) 
for New Advent, made available at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130110.
htm [accessed Aug. 6, 2015]). However, what we love is the good which we 
get to know in the other and this good (or some of it) is present in all human 
beings since, as we are created in God’s image,  “there can be no evil where 
there is no good” (Augustine of Hippo, The Handbook on Faith, Hope and Love 
[The Enchiridion] XIII, taken from http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1302.
htm [accessed Aug. 3, 2015]).
35Thomas Aquinas, On Love and Charity: Readings from the Commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, trans. Peter Kwasniewski, Thomas Bolin & Joseph 
Bolin (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 125.
36“Complacentia is the word which best describes the subjective effect as a 
kind of pleasing affinity which is discharged by the proportion of subject and 
object” (Matthew Kauth, Charity as Divine and Human Friendship: A Metaphysical 
and Scriptural Explanation According to the Thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Romae: 
Saint Benedict Press, 2014).
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affinity and affection: “This affective affinity causes the lover to seek 
deeper union with the beloved and to act for the beloved’s good as if 
it were his own good.”37 Because this unity is affective and based on 
commonality, it is exclusive as it “draws the mind from other things.”38 
It is therefore distinct from Saint Augustine’s ever-widening circles 
of love among diverse individuals. Arguably, of the dictum in Sirach 
6:6 to “[l]et your acquaintances be many but one in a thousand your 
confidant,” Saint Augustine emphasized the first part while Saint 
Thomas the second.
Saint Thomas argues openly that he disagrees with Saint 
Augustine’s view that one should love all equally. He objects that it 
is an “unreasonable position” that is neither possible nor desirable.39 
It is not possible because one will always have a greater affinity or 
intensity of feeling towards some people rather than others: “It is 
also clear that, according to natural love, our relatives are more loved 
in affection; according to a social love, those who are closely united 
to us are loved more ….”40 In Saint Thomas’ view, one also loves 
more those who are more similar to us.41 It is not desirable to love 
all equally because God Himself loves the more virtuous more than 
the less virtuous.
For Saint Thomas, limiting friendship to a close circle does not 
endanger the building of a God-oriented society. To the contrary, it 
can be argued that his more optimistic view of human nature almost 
assumes that this society already exists. The view of the social nature 
of human beings in Saint Thomas seems grounded in Sirach’s principle 
37Michael S. Sherwin, By Knowledge & By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral 
Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2005), 77.
38ST I.II, q. 28, a. 3, co.
39DC IX, co.
40DC IX, co.
41DC IX, ad. 5.
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that “every living thing loves its own kind, every man a man like 
himself. Every being is drawn to its own kind; with its own kind every 
man associates” (Sir. 13:14–15). Moreover, according to Saint Thomas’ 
Weltanschauung, which has strong Aristotelian echoes, “each creature has 
more of an inclination to the universal good than to its own species.”42
The ultimate inclination toward the universal good is perfectly 
compatible with the individual inclination towards self-conservation. 
This is so because a) “the love of charity is a certain inclination infused 
in rational nature for the purpose of tending toward God”43 and b) 
“… the more perfect something is in its power, and the higher it is in 
the scale of goodness, the more does it have an appetite for a broader 
common good, and the more does it seek and become involved in the 
doing of good for beings far removed from itself.”44 Along the lines of 
Aristotle’s naturalist politics, therefore, it is as if an “invisible hand” 
was ordering the instincts of individuals towards the common good 
and, through it, to God. Therefore, in the Holy Roman Empire of 
Saint Thomas’ time, as in the Aristotelian city-state, harmony emerges 
“naturally” without depending on the voluntarist interpersonal 
42Thomas M. Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics 
(Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 103. In this, Saint 
Thomas argues against the 13th century natura curva doctrine, attributed to Saint 
Bernard, that nature desires primarily its own good. That view, he argues, 
erroneously views creatures as isolated individuals rather than as part of a 
species and the universe as a whole. In the Secundum Librum of the Summa, Saint 
Thomas uses his understanding of Aristotelian teleology to reinterpret natura 
curva to mean that nature has an inclination not only for its own perfection, but 
even more for the perfection of the whole. Cf. ST 1, q. 60, a. 5,  ad. 3. Namely, if 
individuals acted for their short-sighted own benefit while ignoring the whole, 
they would not truly be seeking their own good as they would be ignoring 
universal interconnectedness.
43DC IX, co.
44Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 3:24:8, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, 
available at http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3a.htm#24 (accessed 
Dec. 23, 2015).
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friendship networks advocated by Saint Augustine. It is seen as enacted 
by the monarchy or the aristocracy in power.45
Even Saint Thomas acknowledges that not all will work together 
for the formation of such a society. On the contrary, three conditions 
are needed: a) divine help, b) self-help and c) cooperation with fellow 
men.46 Not all cooperation will be equally profound: “… in this we see 
a gradation, for some cooperate only in a general way, while others who 
are more closely united cooperate in a special way. Not all are able to 
cooperate in a special way.”47 Cooperation thus takes place in a world 
in which individual and social interest are assumed to be compatible 
and eventually reflected in the pursuit of the common good by those 
in positions of authority in formal institutions.
Potential Influences on the 
Different Views of the Order of Charity in 
Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas
Family eNViroNmeNt aNd liFe exPerieNCe
Although both Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas were men of 
the Mediterranean, they came from different geographical and family 
environments and had rather different life experiences. Saint Augustine 
was a North African, a Mediterranean through-and-through. He was 
born of a wayward pagan father and a devout Christian mother (Saint 
Monica). His father was a lower-middle ranking bureaucrat of the 
Roman Empire in Thagaste (Tunisia), but he also lived in Carthage 
45Saint Thomas “usually recommends a mixed government, where the king 
collaborates with an aristocracy chosen by the whole people; here [in De Regno 
ad Regem Cypri ] he recommends an absolute monarchy. We perhaps must see the 
reason for this in that he knew the special situation in Cyprus during the time he 
was writing” (Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 170).
46DC, IX, co.
47DC IX, co.
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and Milan. He was born into a family in which not all members were 
well-educated, and grew up comfortable with, and learning from, all 
of them. He became a man of varied worlds.
It is likely that his family experience had a profound influence on 
his views on love and friendship. After all, he was the product of the 
union of a pagan father who had led a rather unfaithful and in many 
ways non-exemplary life and a woman saint. This family experience—
together with his life as a bishop—must have convinced him that, 
“like the old ‘people of Israel,’ the congregation was a mixed body.”48 
His father, despite all his faults, was not an entirely bad man and was 
capable of final conversion. This conversion—as well as his own—was 
catalyzed by the use that the Lord made of Saint Monica with her holy 
patience, her wisdom and her love. His own young adulthood was also 
steeped in sin and error, yet nevertheless, he was able to become the 
man he grew up to be.
This life experience must have imprinted in him the importance 
of recognizing the good and the bad inside everyone, the importance 
of the association, friendship and love between the more and the less 
virtuous, and the vast horizon of hope through the infinite possibilities 
of grace: “For you do not love in him what he is but what you wish 
him to be.”49 Moreover, his life experience brought him into contact 
with needy people of varied religions and combinations of vice and 
virtue. In the process, he became deeply convinced that people of 
apparently less virtue possess many virtues which those who appear 
as outwardly pious often lack, and that, if one gives them a chance, a 
basic equality emerges.
This formative experience was compounded by his years in the 
Manichean movement and was later reflected in his pastoral work as 
48Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 246.
49St. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 112–124, 240. “He loves this 
equality in the other whether or not the beloved understands it. In self-denying 
love I deny the other person as well as myself, but I do not forget him. … I deny 
the other person so as to break through to his real being, just as in searching 
for myself I deny myself” (Arendt, et al., Love and Saint Augustine, 96).
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a Christian bishop. In the Manichean community, he was exposed to 
the contributions of its less formally educated members, who were 
particularly austere as well as the most effective missionaries: “These 
men, ‘unpolished and primitive’, were the most dedicated of all; and, 
not surprisingly in such a movement, they were particularly admired 
by sophisticated intellectuals.”50
Subsequently, in the monastery at Hippo, Saint Augustine created 
an environment in which “uneducated men were the equals of the 
sophisticated.”51 Moreover, as a bishop, he was drawn into tending to 
the needs of a flock of necessarily varying degrees of education and 
virtue. This was an important pastoral experience that also shaped his 
life view as one in which both need and chance rather than hard-and-
fast rules necessarily play a crucial role in the distribution of charity:
… his position as bishop of fourth century Africa was very different 
from the ecclesiastical magnates of medieval times, with their precise 
jurisdictions. In intervening to protect members of his flock, he was 
acting as any Late Roman patron might be expected to act …. 52
It would be difficult indeed to imagine how someone with the 
life experience of Saint Augustine could have embraced a different 
position regarding friendship and love. He was the result of the 
good that can come from the associations between the “virtuous” 
and “the less virtuous,” and so was his father. He must have been 
keenly aware of how “bottled up” the potential of Saint Monica 
would have been had she associated only with the “virtuous.” He 
experienced the actual impossibility to assess other people’s virtue. 
He was a prime witness of the vast potential of humanity and the 
immense good that comes from association among the diverse. He 
was also marked by the practical impossibility of the loving heart to 
ignore need, regardless of virtue, in charity. It seems only natural that 
he saw ever-multiplying relationships of love across humanity, in all 
50Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 45.
51Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 264.
52Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 189.
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the frailty and all the complexity of its fallen nature, driven by need 
and the seeming chance of God’s providence, as the foundation for 
building the city of God.
Saint Thomas, on the other hand, came from a noble Italian family 
of Northern European origin. His relatives were a closely-knit family 
of well-educated, well-off and devout Catholics. It does not seem 
that he had much contact with people who were either entirely non-
educated or “non-virtuous.” On the contrary, he was the product of a 
pious, educated and loving family. It was this background that helped 
him become the saint and the genius he was to be. It is also possible 
that the near-death experience of seeing his little sister struck down 
by lightning at a young age as she was sleeping next to him impressed 
upon him the frailty of our life and the need to remain virtuous at all 
times lest we inadvertently die in sin.
From the time he entered the Benedictine monastery of Monte 
Cassino as a boy, and aside from stays with his family, he spent the rest 
of his days in religious community. This experience, which sheltered 
him from the vice of the world, allowed him to lead a life of holiness 
from beginning to end. After the (possibly legendary) incident with 
the tempting prostitute, it is said he never witnessed carnal temptation 
again. His friends and personal associations were his family and 
the members of his religious communities. Therefore, he must not 
have been directly exposed to many situations of material need or 
experienced the redeeming power of loving relationships among those 
“unequal” in virtue.
At the same time, he had extensive experience with inequality in 
the distribution of intellectual gifts and with the need for intellectual 
charity. Although this was not part of his theology, it was a central part 
of his life experience and he was enormously giving in reacting to it. In 
fact, Saint Thomas does not include need and chance among his criteria 
in the order of charity, but he did practice it in his intellectual charity. 
He was generous to the extreme in the way in which he responded 
to any query posed to him, even if imposing on him and taxing his 
time, distracting him from his main treatises on systematic theology. 
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This is why he wrote so many responses to queries on such a great 
diversity of topics.53
In addition to this refusal to turn down intellectual charity requests 
thrown at him by the “luck of the draw,” he also used the criterion 
of “need” for the good of the Church, devoting much greater time to 
the tasks that were more important. Similarly, although he does not 
include “chance” as a criterion for charity, he does admit that “among 
the fellow-men, he ought to give mutual help to those who are more 
closely united to him or who are more closely related to him.”54 And those 
who “are more closely united to him,” though partly by affinity, can 
also be interpreted to be so partly by chance.
Saint Thomas was thus arguably compelled by need and chance in 
the choice of his intellectual output—the greatest work of charity of his 
life. Every task he undertook, whether in studying or in producing, was 
driven by what was needed to support the mystical body of Christ. He 
devoted himself to his students and his teaching tasks wholeheartedly, 
whether it was with the “Dominican intellectual elite” at Paris or 
with the fratres communes at Orvieto. In fact, he dedicated the greatest 
work of his life to the less knowledgeable students. As he states in the 
Summa: “the teacher of Catholic truth should not only teach the most 
advanced but also instruct the beginners … our intention is therefore 
to explain what concerns the Christian religion according to the 
mode that is necessary for the formation of beginners.”55 It is quite 
possible that, had he “by chance” only taught advanced students in 
53Torrell calls him “a theologian much in demand” and notes: “we immediately 
get the impression of intense literary activity. … quite often these are works of 
circumstance, undertakings meant to respond to a question that is more or less 
official, or from a friend. Such requests are a flattering echo of confidence in 
his competence” (Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 
122 [italics added]). They are also a reflection of his deep intellectual charity and 
refusal to deny this charity even when drawn to him by “chance” and arguably, 
to a good extent, regardless of “virtue.”
54DC IX, co. (italics added).
55Torrell, 145, citing the introduction to Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae.
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Paris, he may not have realized the need for such a “manual.” He was 
also driven to write a “beginners’ work” by the need he observed due 
to the fact that existing manuals like Raymond of Penyafort’s Summa 
de Casibus were excessively repetitive and did not sufficiently ground 
moral theology in systematic theology. On the other hand, his life did 
not bring him into contact with varying degrees of virtue in situations 
in which he had to exercise the order of charity. Had he experienced 
such circumstances, he may have reacted as he did in the distribution 
of his intellectual charity—allowing need and chance to also play a 
role in practice if not in theory.
Family and life experience are thus likely to have deeply influenced 
the order of charity in Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas in both 
theory and practice. Saint Augustine lived surrounded by many 
people of dubious virtue and “utility to the common good” while 
Saint Thomas lived surrounded by the “virtuous and socially useful.” 
Moreover, Saint Augustine could, for much of his life, have considered 
himself as forming part of the first group while Saint Thomas was, 
throughout his life, part of the second. Therefore, in Saint Augustine, 
a life experience of the centrality of need and chance in effecting 
conversion may have shaped his order of charity. In the case of Saint 
Thomas, although the principles of virtue, friendship among equals 
and utility to the common good are strong in his moral theology, 
they are arguably less so in practice. When the “luck of the draw” 
put before him the need for (intellectual) charity, he responded to it 
with the same passionate dedication that Saint Augustine articulated 
in his writings.56
geograPhy aNd hiStory
Both Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas were men of the Roman 
Catholic tradition of the Mediterranean world. Nevertheless, they lived 
in very different regions, time periods and cultures. Saint Augustine 
56Nevertheless, Saint Thomas would probably have viewed his exercise of 
intellectual charity as being drawn not as much by “random” individual need 
as by a desire to serve the “common good.”
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was a North African from a rural area, a backwater of the late Roman 
Empire. He lived during the last years and after the fall of the Empire. 
His world was one in which paganism and heresy—from Manicheism 
to Donatism and Pelagianism—were thriving and Christianity was 
not yet well-established. The Roman, and more broadly the classical, 
intellectual traditions were still a living reality. Its proponents were 
presenting Christianity as an upstart and dangerous cult with a highly 
questionable philosophical foundation. The institutions of the Roman 
world were crumbling and the Church was struggling while remaining 
resilient. Society consisted of small communities— arguably Popperian 
closed societies based on family, kinship and patronage—where people 
sought refuge from a crumbling world. Formal political institutions 
and impersonal rules could not be taken for granted while the Church, 
community and friendship offered a potentially safe haven from the 
vagaries of the outside world.
The attacks of the pagan world on the Christian community 
continued, both intellectually as well as, on occasion, physically. 
The world of higher learning was still largely dominated by pagan 
philosophy, particularly in North Africa. Christians and their 
supposed weak citizenship were being blamed for the collapse of the 
Roman Empire. It was against this background that Saint Augustine’s 
social, political and theological thinking developed. In the world he 
experienced, the idealized city-state of Plato and Aristotle as well as 
the sturdy Holy Roman Empire of Saint Thomas’ 13th century would 
have appeared as a mirage—if the Roman Empire had crumbled, any 
earthly city could. No rules were solid. No human institutions were 
infallible. Moreover, Saint Augustine had witnessed the deterioration 
of the Roman Empire to an extent of corruption and injustice that it 
could no longer qualify as a “society.” Only a city of God, built on the 
values of Christ, through the ever-widening circles of love initiated by 
Christ and his disciples and continued by the Christian communities 
and the Church as a whole, could ever approximate the peace and 
unity which the human heart seeks.
Saint Thomas, on the other hand, was born in Southern Italy, 
a hub of the Holy Roman Empire of the 13th century. In his family 
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and despite their struggles, the Pope and the Emperor were relatively 
solid twin pillars of life. Uncertainties regarded how to rein so much 
institutional power and how to make both instances compatible. It 
was a world of firmly-established rules and well-developed “open” 
Popperian institutions. Christianity was well established economically, 
politically, socially and religiously, and paganism had long ago receded 
into history. The world of great European universities of which Saint 
Thomas was a part was thriving and dominated by the Church. It was 
a time in which Europe felt secure enough in its Christianity to look 
back to its classical roots with confidence. It had been long enough 
after the demise of the Greco-Roman world that it even looked back 
to this distant past with longing. The corpus classicus was being rescued 
from the oblivion of the Dark Ages and the ancient Greeks were 
being translated into Latin as the Western Empire had long lost its 
knowledge of Greek.
Saint Thomas, therefore, could believe in an orderly world of rules 
for the allocation of charity in a way that would have been difficult, 
if not impossible, for Saint Augustine to conceive. He could also 
leave the building of the foundation for a stable society to the role of 
formal institutions. Saint Augustine, on the contrary, would be led by 
his historical experience to be more of a believer in informal social 
relationships as the basis of society and the “luck of the draw” as 
guiding opportunities for charity as human beings waded through an 
uncertain life. Saint Thomas, steeped as he was in Aristotle’s teleology 
and the solid institutions of the 13th century, would be more inclined 
towards the utility of the common good as the most rational guide to 
charity aside from family ties, first principles and virtue.
Finally, Saint Augustine seemed to rely on need and chance and 
Saint Thomas on the utility of the common good. Arguably, however, 
they used twin principles of “need” adapted to their historical time—
Saint Augustine’s being more Platonic, intention-based, personal and 
fluid, and Saint Thomas’ being more Aristotelian, finality-oriented 
and institutionalized as the “common good.”
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iNtelleCtual eduCatioN aNd 
PhiloSoPhiCal aFFiliatioN
Saint Augustine’s education was not particularly deeply rooted in 
the classics, especially the Greek. He was mainly educated in Latin 
literature (particularly Virgil, Cicero, Sallust and Terence) without a deep 
grounding in philosophy, history, or science.57 Unlike Saint Thomas, 
Saint Augustine would not have been considered an expert philosopher 
in “an era oppressed by reverence for the ‘expert’ [and where] everything 
outside the corpus classicus was considered non-scientific.”58/59
Moreover, Saint Augustine was not by disposition a “type croyant,”60 
but rather a natural, even systematic, questioner. He pursued truth 
wherever he could find it. This he had in common with Saint Thomas. 
In addition, however, Saint Augustine had an anti-hierarchical and 
arguably even antinomian personality which was not at home within 
any single school of thought and did not have particular reverence for 
any single thinker. In this, he followed those intellectuals that Brown 
calls the “Latin amateurs” who “never committed themselves entirely 
to the ideas they handled. They felt, however obscurely, that there 
was more to life than metaphysical systems ….”61 At the same time, 
he was following in the footsteps of one of his greatest intellectual 
influences, Cicero, who had “urged Augustine to seek Wisdom: ‘I 
should not chase after this or that philosophical sect, but should 
love Wisdom, of whatever kind it should be ….’”62 In not espousing 
57Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 24.
58Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 41.
59Brown argues for “Augustine’s religious ‘emancipation’ … from his elders 
and betters in the university of Carthage, from the pretentious professors, whom 
he secretly despised” (Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 38).
60Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 105 (italics in original).
61Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 85.
62Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 30. In this, Brown sees Saint Augustine 
like a Latin rhetor, “caught between Christianity and paganism … glad, as 
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any specific school of thought and questioning not only conclusions 
but assumptions as well, he was arguably also following the ultimate 
questioning philosopher in perpetual search of the truth—Plato.
Saint Augustine’s focus on the “ideal” society and on normative 
principles is also Platonic. The city of God is the ultimate Christian 
“Platonic” or ideal society as is the principle that the earthly society 
is to attempt to “participate” in it so as to resemble it to the extent 
possible. The idea of a “society of friends” or “the state as a large 
family” based on love as the ideal one is also both Platonic and 
Biblical.63 Similarly, Saint Augustine’s belief that justice consists in 
the right ordering of things both within souls and within societies 
also finds its roots in Plato. Saint Augustine’s non-inclusion of the 
principle of virtue as criteria in his order of charity can also be seen as 
a combination of Socratic philosophical agnosticism about the limits 
of human knowledge with the oft-repeated Biblical injunction not to 
judge other human beings’ virtue, as the Lord is the only judge.
At the same time, however, Saint Augustine firmly broke ranks 
with Plato’s elitism in the radical essential egalitarianism which shines 
through in his writings, but which in turn does not negate the need 
for simply functional subordination in a well-ordered society. This 
view of the human being and the world explains the absence of the 
Augustine had once been glad, to have Cicero to shelter behind, against the cold 
winds of philosophical dogmatism and clerical orthodoxy” (Brown, Augustine of 
Hippo: A Biography, 94). I would argue Saint Augustine never fully lost the desire 
for intellectual and spiritual freedom, aspiring only to fully expound Christianity 
(as distinct from “clerical orthodoxy”).
63Aristotle criticized this Platonic ideal:
As to organizing the political community, Aristotle explains that the 
end of political communities differs from the end of other kinds of 
associations, such as the family, of which the political community is an 
outgrowth. … Criticizing Plato, as well as the innovative suggestions of 
many other theorists, for wanting to turn the state into a large family, 
Aristotle contends there are no important discoveries to be made in the 
realm of political organization. (Richard Popkin, The Columbia History of 
Western Philosophy [New York: Columbia University Press, 2013], 69)
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principle of virtue in his order of charity. Finally, the Platonic idea that 
the natural world reflects a predetermined intelligible order and that 
the best possible world imitates the ultimate good is “Christianized” 
in Saint Augustine’s view of the exchange of love in human society 
as imitating the exchange of love between the three persons of the 
Holy Trinity.
This education—and lack of it—jointly with his disposition freed 
his outstanding intellect, his ebullient imagination and his restless heart 
from any single framework aside from that provided by the Bible, and 
yielded some of the most brilliant and profound writing of Christianity 
and the history of humankind. That is why the worldview of Saint 
Augustine does not fit into any philosophical stream except, if such is 
not an oxymoron, that of the Bible.
To the extent that Saint Augustine had a “philosophical home,” 
that would have been Neo-Platonism and the Christian Neo-Platonists 
of the Milan of his time.64 In particular, the influence of Plotinus and 
Porphyry, whom Augustine always calls “doctissimus” and “the most 
notable pagan philosopher,” can be perceived throughout his writings. 
As Brown explains, however, they had been thoroughly “absorbed,” 
“digested” and “transformed.”65 
One of the ideas of the Neo-Platonist philosophical universe 
that most profoundly influenced him was the conception of evil as 
“a turning away into separateness: its very existence assumed the 
existence of an order, which was flouted while remaining no less real 
and meaningful.”66 This idea of evil as separation from a natural order 
that is good provided a philosophical construct for a view that was 
64Arguably, he mainly retained, from Manicheism, a “counter-reaction.” 
Namely, it is possible that his emphasis on the limitations of rationality as a 
guide to true knowledge and the passionate defense of the body as opposed 
to the strong Gnostic dualism between body and soul may be reactions to his 
Manichean past.
65Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 83 and 86.
66Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 91.
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deeply Biblical. Indeed, Saint Augustine saw the essence of the fall of 
humanity as loss of unity and alienation within the individual, across 
individuals and from God. This can be traced from original sin to 
the episode of the Tower of Babel and the scattering and division it 
produced and which continue to this day. Repairing this alienated 
world of the earthly city through the recreation of unity using ever-
widening circles of loving friendships is at the core of the Augustinian 
order of charity and the key to building the city of God. Aside from 
family and need, no specific man-made order is necessary in carrying 
out this task; rather, only a loving response to the “chance” encounter 
with the other is needed.
Another influence from Plotinus consisted in turning inward, into 
the human soul, the great struggle which Late Antiquity—whether 
pagan or Christian—thought existed between good and evil.67 In fact, 
the Augustinian centrality of this Plotinus-influenced (yet profoundly 
Biblical) view that the global struggle between good and evil takes place 
inside each human being would have made a virtue-based idea of the 
order of charity difficult to sustain. Instead, it fits perfectly with Saint 
Augustine’s view of the Church—and, arguably, the individual—as a 
corpus permixtum in a never-ending struggle for improvement through 
non-virtue-based and deeply evangelical circles of love.
The theme of love is at the center of both the Bible and Plato. Saint 
Augustine’s diverse societies also parallel both Christian communities 
as well as the participants in Plato’s dialogues, each contributing their 
unique bit to the pursuit of the truth and the good. Like in Plato’s 
Symposium, even the rowdy guests intruding drunk at the last moment 
in the banquet end up not only being won over by the philosophers, 
but prove to have “a philosopher” inside them. Plato’s influence may 
also have helped Saint Augustine conceptualize the Bible’s relationships 
as the foundation for building the city of God.
67Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 240–241. Of course, the engine 
driving the “latent principle within the inner world” that drives the ascent of the 
soul is different in each case. For Plotinus, it is “the divine within the soul itself”; 
for Saint Augustine, it is Christ (Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 241).
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Saint Thomas, on the other hand, was fundamentally a Christian 
Aristotelian in whose writings the influence of “the Philosopher” is 
most pervasive.68 Five key Aristotelian ideas seem to have been infused 
into the ordering of charity in Saint Thomas: teleology, virtue, first 
principle, utility and the common good. Aristotle shares Plato’s idea of 
both the reality of the existence and the desirability of order in nature 
and society. At the same time, he has a more pronounced teleological 
view of the human act and human interaction than Plato. In fact, 
finality is so important in Aristotle that, in his philosophical system, 
“randomness … is the miscarriage of natural teleology.”69 In such a 
system, the end is what matters most and randomness is abhorred.
This priming of the end in Aristotle’s ethics can also help explain 
the difference between Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas in the 
ordering of charity. While for Saint Augustine need as a guiding 
principle of charity is viewed as applying to the individual for his own 
sake, in Saint Thomas it becomes transformed into the utility of the 
individual for the common good. Thus, Saint Thomas argues that it is 
more desirable for us to show charity in our actions to the individuals 
who have the greatest potential to bring about good to the community 
as a whole (such as the general of an army or the leader of a society).
Relatedly, Saint Thomas’ inclusion of the principle of virtue 
as a critical guiding criterion for the exercise of charity also seems 
profoundly Aristotelian. In Aristotle’s concept of justice, everyone 
receives “their due.” In fact, his distributive justice consists in allotting 
goods in a manner proportional to each person’s virtue. The same 
68This did not prevent him from disagreeing with Aristotle wherever he saw a 
contradiction with the Bible, such as in the philosopher’s belief in the eternity of 
the world. Moreover, Saint Thomas also had areas of Platonic and neo-Platonic 
influence, particularly as regards the doctrine of ideas and the conception of the 
Creation as following prototypes living within the divine Logos ( Josef Pieper, 
Guide to Thomas Aquinas [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991], 43–44) and the 
idea of participation, e.g., “the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing 
else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light” (ST I, q. 84, a. 5, co).
69Popkin, The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, 59.
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applies to charity. In ST II, II, q. 26, a. 9, Saint Thomas answers that 
“the better a thing is and the more like to God, the more is it to be 
loved.” This idea is consistent with Aristotle’s idea of perfect friendship 
as one among the virtuous as well as with his overall view of the 
need for equality, or at least equality of exchange, among individuals 
in relationships of friendship. Virtue as a guiding principle for the 
exercise of charity in Saint Thomas thus seems modeled indeed on 
this Aristotelian vision.
The naturalistic search for the first principle in action and the 
attribution of ethical primacy to that principle is also an important 
determinant in Saint Thomas’ order of charity. Most prominently, the 
primacy of father over mother in the order of charity in ST II-II, q. 26, 
a. 10 is explained in that “the father is principle in a more excellent way 
than the mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother 
is a passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the 
father is to be loved more.”70
Utility is another fundamental principle of the Aristotelian 
system. Friendship among individuals is based on utility, with lower 
levels of it being pleasant and profitable and the higher level being 
that of virtue. Concord among states is similarly based on utility; it is 
essentially a relationship of cooperation based on self-interest. Some 
of this Aristotelian view of utility can be found in Saint Thomas’ view 
of friendship and in his ordering of charity, especially as it relates to 
the common good.
The fact that friendship is only with a few and of the virtuous 
with the virtuous seems influenced by a utilitarian conception of 
relationships. Of course, in Saint Thomas the ultimate end is to grow 
closer to God in knowledge and love. It would seem that this Christian 
objective combined with an Aristotelian utilitarian conception of 
friendship resulted in Saint Thomas’ understanding of friendship. It is 
also a combination of the Christian (including Augustinian) desire for 
70ST II-II, q. 26, a. 10, co. Saint Thomas also quotes St. Jerome who, writing 
on Ezekiel 44:25, mentions fathers before mothers as support for this order 
(cf. ST II-II, q. 26, a. 10, s. c.).
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promoting the common good with Aristotelian utilitarianism that helps 
explain Saint Thomas’ setting the utility of a person to the common 
good as trumping other principles of charity in action. In Saint 
Thomas, like in Aristotle and unlike in Saint Augustine, friendship 
is not the basis of the well-functioning state; rather, institutions and 
individuals assumed to act for the common good are.71
In Aristotle, the ultimate good of the state resides not in the system 
of government it adopts but in the government’s ability to act for the 
interests of its subjects rather than its own interest. This idea of the 
common good is essential in Saint Thomas, including in his idea of 
the order of charity. The ability of the state to act for the common 
good, according to Aristotle, depends mainly on the education of all 
its citizens. The centrality of education is a principle which does not 
explicitly feature in Saint Thomas’ ideal order of charity. However, as 
described above, a focus on promoting a thorough education going well 
beyond the elites is certainly a principle which Saint Thomas applied 
throughout his life in his writing, his disputing and his teaching as 
well as through his role in Dominican General Chapter Meetings.72 
In Orvieto, he was to devote himself “to regular teaching of those 
who … had not been able to study in the studia generalia or even the 
provincialia—which was the case for nine out of ten friars”—and, as 
71“For Aristotle, perfect friendship is of no service to the state because it is not 
a political means to an end, as it tended to be for Plato” (Popkin, The Columbia 
History of Western Philosophy, 69).
72I am not aware of the specific role Saint Thomas played at the 1259 Dominican 
Chapter in Valenciennes. However, we do know that he was one of the five 
masters who formed part of the commission established to promote studies.
The commission sketched out a series of recommendations that were 
inserted into the chapter’s acts. All these acts asserted the priority of 
study over other tasks …. As to the young, superiors should select those 
most adept at study to be sent to a studium generale; the older brothers 
should be reminded that even the priors are supposed to follow courses 
…. If a province is too poor in personnel to provide a lecturer in each 
priory … they should instead be sent wherever they can to be formed. 
(Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 97).
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mentioned above, the Summa was dedicated to beginners such as his 
former students.73
Finally, there is a further influence in the order of love as viewed 
by Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas that is rooted in their respective 
Platonic versus Aristotelian perspectives. Saint Augustine drew his 
theology and political theory from a psychological-sociological view of 
the world with a strong normative and metaphysical bent and certain 
skepticism about method. Saint Thomas, on the other hand, drew his 
theology from a positivist and strongly worldly naturalist philosophy 
aiming at approximating science.74 The Augustinian focus on need, 
chance and “a society of friends” fits neatly within the former. The 
Thomist emphasis on a set of fully specified criteria based on virtue, 
first principle and utility to the common good fits well within the latter.
PerSoNality
All of the above-discussed factors are certainly enough to explain 
the differences in the order of charity in Saint Augustine and Saint 
Thomas. And yet, I would argue that their vastly different personalities 
also shed light on their personal perspectives on the subject. Below are 
some thoughts on these differences and how they may have affected 
each saint.
Saint Augustine was a handsome, charming man with an ardent 
personality, passionate, sensual and gregarious. He was also a man 
with what has been diversely called a gift of “instant and moving 
sympathy”75 for others and a “gift for universal sympathy.”76 Arguably, 
73Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 118–119.
74“[T]heology and philosophy here encountered one another—philosophy in 
the sense that Thomas defined it … as a mode of seeing things as they are in 
themselves …” (Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, 47 [italics in original]).
75J. O’Meara, The Young Augustine: An Introduction to the Confessions of St. 
Augustine (London & NY: Longman, 1980), 87.
76Abbé Bardy, The Christian Latin Literature of the First Six Centuries, trans. Mother 
Marie Reginald (Rockville, Maryland: Wildside Press, 2010), 134.
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“the dominant characteristic of Saint Augustine’s genius and the true 
secret to his action must be sought in his heart which animated the 
highest speculations of a profound mind with a most intense passion.”77 
This expansive personality and his gift and need for friendship and 
sociability help explain how he could conceive of an ideal world based 
on ever-widening circles of love. Moreover, his long struggle with his 
sensuality and lust could be seen as having been tamed, sublimated 
and transformed into non-concupiscent loving social expansiveness.
As discussed, Saint Augustine’s life-long experience of friendships 
with people of broadly diverse educational and social backgrounds as 
well as his own and his father’s conversions must have fostered this 
personal penchant for understanding all and befriending all. But his 
personality must have helped as well. Someone with a natural gift and 
inclination for sociability can easily establish a personal connection 
with a great variety of peoples whereas shyer personalities tend 
to feel more comfortable with the like-minded. In addition, Saint 
Augustine’s idea of friendship is based on trust and entails serious risk. 
And Saint Augustine was certainly a risk-taker. His restless heart and 
adventuresome personality must not only have not recoiled at the risk 
entailed by his propounded ever-widening circles of love, but almost 
relished it or, at least, did not shun it.78
The intensely personal tone revealed in most of Saint Augustine’s 
writings reflects someone comfortable with having his personality 
shining through his work. He did not see subjectivity as an evil, 
but rather as unavoidable and even as essentially good, as it is this 
subjectivity that allows him to connect with the other and inject the 
77See Eugène Portal ié, “Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo,” The 
Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 2 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907), 
as made available at the New Advent website (http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/02091a.htm).
78The one aspect in which he abhorred risk, given his own personal experience, 
was theological error. This, jointly with the historical time he lived in, which 
was marked by the Donatist and later Pelagian controversies, helps explain his 
harsh stance toward heresy.
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emotion that helps the preacher put a message through into the heart 
of the listener. In fact, and despite his protestations to the contrary, 
Saint Augustine is essentially the ideal preacher he portrays in De 
Doctrina Christiana. In that work as in his sermons and most notably 
in the Confessions, he uses the personal tone, makes the personal 
connections and uses the emotions that he knows will help him in 
swaying his listeners. Someone with such a preaching persona would 
also be more inclined by personality and function to prime the 
establishment of personal relationships in building society as well as 
to leave judgment, including on the order of charity, to an individual’s 
necessarily subjective assessment of the order of charity, which is to 
be engaged in through “chance.”
Finally, Saint Augustine’s independent personality, with its anti-
hierarchical, anti-establishment bent, could have influenced his 
preference for a fluid order where an individual can exercise his own 
judgment on the order of charity based on the broad principles of 
family, need and chance. It may also have made him skeptical of a purely 
“top-down” assessment of the common good and of the desirability of 
dispensing charity with preference to individuals who are expected, by 
their position, to contribute to it. Even his own personal experience, 
as someone who would have been judged for much of his life to be 
“less virtuous or socially useful to the common good,” could have left 
a legacy of personal empathy with those in need, regardless of their 
perceived virtue or “social utility.”
Saint Thomas was a man of the mind: contemplative, self-
restrained, with a preference for either deep conversation or solitude. 
Within his family and with his small circles of confreres and friends, 
he was profoundly appreciated and admired for his dedication, wisdom 
and his virtue. He was hard-working and methodical, with a clearly set 
routine to his days. He abhorred travel. In many ways, he embodied 
the Aristotelian mean, neither given to unbridled sensuality nor to 
ascetical excesses.79 As regards his writing style, Josef Pieper points out: 
79“Sensuality is good (so much so that Thomas calls ‘unsensuality’ not merely 
a defect, but a vitium, a moral deficiency); anger is good; sexuality is good” 
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Thomas does not have that [Saint Augustine’s] brilliance of style, that 
verbal grace, that musk; neither does he have that personal tone. … at 
bottom Thomas wishes to communicate something else entirely, and 
that alone; he wishes to make plain, not his own inner state, but his 
insight into a given subject.80
It seems logical that such a more purely reason- and method-driven 
personality, jointly with a focus on teaching rather than preaching, 
favored objectivity over subjectivity and was more drawn to formal 
institutions and well-established rules and less comfortable using 
“chance” as a criterion for ordering charity. Instead, Saint Thomas 
would be more drawn to as fully specified a set of criteria as possible.81
Contrary to Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, having been 
surrounded his whole life with relative “virtue,” may have been more 
personally inclined to prime it. Even his family’s antics in trying to 
prevent him from entering the Dominican order, or their preference for 
the money and power that Saint Thomas’ remaining in Monte Cassino 
may have brought them, were likely so common at the time as not to 
be considered “non-virtuous.” Regardless, a family with the standing 
of Saint Thomas’ would have been considered as highly useful to the 
common good. This experience may also have affected his priority 
for the “socially useful” in his ordering of charity. 
Like Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas was an independent thinker 
and a systematic questioner in search of the truth. Contrary to Saint 
Augustine, however, he had a much deeper reverence for the knowledge 
of the leading philosophers of the time, regardless of religion. He 
respectfully quotes and uses Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, Dionysius 
and Maimonides, among others. He was a University Master, a part of 
(Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, 122).
80Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, 109.
81Pieper stresses: “An outstanding trait of Saint Thomas’ style is, it seems 
to me, its sobriety. … I mean the firm rejection and avoidance of everything 
that might conceal, obscure, or distort reality. I mean extreme receptivity to 
reality, unencumbered by any sort of subjectivity …” (Pieper, Guide to Thomas 
Aquinas, 115).<LFN>
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the “society of the elect” of the time by birth, and by education and 
by expertise one of the most respected philosophers of his time. As 
a 13th century Dominican Master, he could be seen as having lived 
in a Christian version of the small societies of “virtuous philosopher 
friends” espoused by Aristotle.
Therefore, given Saint Thomas’ personality and experience, the 
idea that the common good would be delivered by a world of ever-
widening circles of love among the diverse, infusing and surpassing 
formal institutions, must have been difficult to conceive. On the 
contrary, the striving of those in positions of authority to ascertain 
and enact the common good must have seemed feasible while favoring 
them as well as the virtuous in the order of charity must have appeared 
as desirable.
Conclusion
Both Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas include family as a 
criterion for the distribution of charity. The remaining criteria they 
use, however, differ. Saint Augustine relies on need and chance. Saint 
Thomas primes virtue, first principles and utility to the achievement 
of the common good. Their varying family and life experiences, 
geographical and historical contexts, intellectual education and 
philosophical affiliation and their personalities help explain these 
differences. At the same time, in the practice of their lives, the gap 
was arguably narrower than in their writings.
<ENF>
